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Introduction
The president of a liberal arts college, if asked why college is worthwhile, 
would be able to respond on several levels. He or she would certainly say 
something about the value of the degree as a credential to help students get a 
job or get into graduate school. In addition, he or she would likely emphasize 
the professional value of the skills and capacities developed through a liberal 
education, which can help students succeed at work or in graduate school. 
More deeply, however, we would expect that he or she would have something 
to say about the intrinsic value of the education and experience itself—why a 
thoughtful person might want to go to college, apart from the work it might 
help one get or do.
I believe that something similar can be said about law school. The legal 
academy and profession are confronting difficult questions about the value of 
legal education—about whether and how law school is worthwhile. Most of this 
conversation appropriately focuses on the commercial and professional value 
of a legal education because that is the main reason people go to law school—
to qualify and prepare for careers. Here, I hope to add to the conversation by 
considering a set of ways in which law school, like a liberal arts undergraduate 
education, may be valuable to a thoughtful person apart from its instrumental 
value in qualifying and preparing one for work. How might legal education 
help one to thrive, to live a full and satisfying and meaningful life?
I recognize that framing the question in this way may create some skepticism. 
Indeed, vague talk about liberal education in the face of concrete realities, such 
as escalating tuition and unclear job prospects, warrants skepticism. Moreover, 
thinking about law school and thriving requires a willingness to think about 
what it means to thrive: Who are we to say what it might mean for any given 
person to live a full and satisfying life? But if we are to be thoughtful about 
the impact of law school on the quality of lives, we must be willing to think at 
least tentatively about what makes for quality in life. All we can do—indeed, 
what I think we have an obligation to do—is to try to be as thoughtful as we 
can about the ways in which legal education also may be valuable education 
for life, even if not every student will appreciate that deeper value, and even if 
it proves more difficult to describe than its more obvious professional benefits. 
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Here then is a tentative starting point, two closely related things a thoughtful 
person might consider components of a full and rich life: First is meaning and 
purpose, a sense that one’s life is not pointless but has some significance, and 
is, if lived well, worthwhile; and second is understanding and appreciation of 
the world, the sense that the world in which we live is not a random mess, but 
makes sense, and is, if seen well, beautiful. Granted that these are things worth 
having, how can law school help? I suggest that legal education can develop 
the capacity to see and understand things better and in ways that can help one 
live meaningfully and well.
I do not mean that law school should focus on these things directly; we 
should not replace or even supplement contracts and torts with classes on the 
meaning of life or the beauty of the cosmos. Law school must teach law and 
lawyering and nothing I say here is meant to deny that law schools above 
all must provide professional training. Indeed, my claim is that it is the very 
study of law and lawyering that can develop the capacities and habits of mind 
that, in turn, can help one wrestle with deeper issues. Nor is it a question of 
“balancing” the professional and personal elements, as perhaps by mixing in 
some “law and ___” or theoretical classes, along with practical and doctrinal 
classes. Indeed, I believe that the dichotomy between practical training and 
the development of deeper capacities is a false one. Rather, the very education 
that trains one for work as a lawyer also, and for overlapping reasons, can 
prepare one to thrive as a human being. Here I hope to explore how that can 
be the case.
I also recognize that many students do not experience law school as 
something that can nourish one’s inner life; they are more likely to describe 
law school as soul-crushing than as soul food. In response, first of all, some 
difficult and demanding work is just part of the process; some of the discomfort 
students feel in the classroom may be evidence that the process is working. 
Lung-busting sprints build wind; muscle-exhausting weight lifting builds 
strength. More to the point, we hardly can expect students to make the most 
of law school unless they see what it is possible to make of it. If we hope to 
encourage students to understand and experience law school as something 
with potential intrinsic human value, we need to try to articulate what that 
value may be. 
We could focus on how a legal education can be put to work in public service 
and effective citizenship. This is, of course, a key value of legal education and 
a crucial reason why many students go to law school—to be useful to others, 
or to make useful change in the world. Thinking of law school as professional 
training need not mean thinking of it, or putting it to work, selfishly. I grant 
and will return to this point. First, however, I want to think about how legal 
education may be worthwhile to students themselves. That said, I recognize 
that to talk about individual thriving as something distinct from public service 
and citizenship may be misleading. One way to give meaning to a life may be 
though public service and participation in a community. If so, and if meaning 
is, indeed, central to thriving, then legal education may help students to thrive 
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by enabling them to better serve and participate. Granting that, here I hope to 
consider another, less-obvious but equally valuable set of ways law school may 
help one thrive—by helping to build capacities more personal than public. I 
will return to the potential other-regarding manifestations of these traits. My 
primary focus, however, will be less on what these capacities may help one do 
or accomplish in private or public life and more on what they may help one 
see and appreciate in both.
“A Certain Blindness”
The material of the law may be doctrine, procedure, policy and the like but 
the central activity of the law is persuasion. Whether arguing to a judge or 
jury, counseling a client, speaking to fellow legislators or negotiating a deal, 
lawyers must bring to bear substantive knowledge and professional skills not 
merely in the abstract but also in ways that will resonate with those they must 
reach. Law school, therefore, is not just about analysis but also argument—not 
just about policy but also and, essentially, about persuasion.
And while the material of persuasion may be logic, reason, and the 
construction of arguments, the heart of persuasion is comprehension. Every 
lawyer and negotiator knows that the most well-informed and well-constructed 
argument will not persuade unless it speaks to what matters to the person it 
must reach. It must find or make space in the world view of the individual 
to be persuaded. And to speak to what matters to others first requires an 
understanding and appreciation of what matters to them. We cannot make 
space in the world views of others unless we can see the world as they do. 
Doctrinal training can help us make logical legal arguments but we will not 
make persuasive arguments unless we confront what William James called 
“a certain human blindness”1—our inability to imagine the world from the 
perspective of others and understand and appreciate what matters to them 
and why. 
This capacity, whether one calls it sympathetic engagement, intellectual 
empathy, or simply putting oneself in the shoes of another, obviously is not 
only valuable to lawyers. Negotiators, leaders of all sorts, even salesman, know 
that it is essential to understand what matters to, and, thus, what might move, 
motivate, or reach those with whom they must work. But this capacity is central 
to the lawyer, whose work is persuasion, and whose primary tool is argument. 
This is one reason we teach as we often do—pressing students to make and 
respond to arguments, to articulate and to defend alternate positions, and to 
come to terms with the views other than their own. This also is one reason we 
value a diverse classroom, in which students encounter a range of views. But 
what classmates do not provide, we as teachers do: We articulate competing 
views, play devil’s advocate, and demand that students come to terms with 
important issues not just from their own particular perspectives but also from 
1. William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in William James, Talks to 
Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals 229 (Henry Holt and Co. 
1899). 
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the perspectives of others. This is a way of learning the raw material of the 
law, of course. But more than that, it is a process of developing the ability 
to persuade, which, in turn, requires, and, thus, can engender, the ability to 
comprehend.
This capacity is as valuable in life as in law and not just because it can help 
us persuade people. More deeply, thinking well about what people care about 
and what things mean to them calls upon us to imagine more broadly what 
might matter and what it is possible for things to mean. James aimed to help 
us feel “how soaked and shot-through life is with values and meanings which 
we fail to realize because of our external and insensible point of view.”2 And 
because, as James recognized, we never can enter fully into the perspective 
of another, this is as much an imaginative as intellectual capacity, calling on 
us to stretch our minds to imagine different ways of seeing the world. Our 
work, thus, demands from and can develop in us the ability and willingness 
to triangulate our life and world from the imagined perspectives of others. It 
thus can enrich and broaden our sense of the possible. And if thriving involves 
in part a search for what can or ought to matter in life and for what life does 
or can mean, this capacity, albeit developed for professional persuasion, is a 
valuable personal capacity, indeed.
Making Sense of Experience
Persuasion in and about the law is not merely about what different people 
want or think ought to matter. It is also, and fundamentally, about rooting our 
arguments in relevant authority—text, precedent, tradition and the like. Indeed, 
experienced practitioners sometimes advise new lawyers not to make “policy 
arguments.” And this is good advice, at least to the extent that it reminds 
practitioners that judges, for example, are unlikely to care what a particular 
lawyer thinks the law ought to be. But every lawyer also knows that authority 
rarely resolves difficult questions in mechanical fashion. Or, more precisely, 
we know that the many questions to which authority gives an unambiguous 
answer can be resolved by any lawyer or without much help from a lawyer at 
all. What will come to our attention as lawyers, and call upon our training and 
talents, are those situations in which law clearly matters but in which it is not 
clear what the law is. 
So we learn to argue about what the law is and means. In ways that vary 
widely in varying circumstances, we learn to think about the relationship and 
connection between authority and outcomes—the meaning of an enactment, 
the reasons for a rule, the scope of a precedent, the relevance of a tradition or 
practice. We are constantly engaged in a process of finding or giving meaning 
to what we have said and done. We also argue about what considerations 
appropriately give meaning in various contexts. We sometimes, for example, 
appropriately emphasize the formal meaning of texts. But we sometimes 
necessarily broaden the inquiry to include the larger context in which a 
2. William James, What Makes a Life Significant, in James, Talks to Teachers, supra note 1, at 
265. 
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particular authority must be understood or the ends it should be understood to 
serve. More broadly still, this is also, if often implicitly, a process of continuous 
self-definition. Thinking well about the meaning of what we have said and 
done calls upon us to think deeply about our community itself. 
Legal argument, thus, calls upon us to examine past events and decisions, 
find meaning or purpose in them, and think about how they apply to present 
and perhaps unanticipated circumstances, with an eye to the future. So this, 
too, is what we require of our students in the law school classroom. Granted, we 
often make space for wide ranging, normative argumentation about what the 
law should be and why, just as we spend substantial time simply explaining or 
requiring students to explain the concrete operation and application of legal 
rules and principles that may be unambiguous but can be complex. But more 
often, and steadily, we press our students to weave these two threads together 
in the way that legal argument demands—to root argument in authority, to 
ground policy in precedent. We require students to think and to argue about 
how what we have said and done illuminates what we want or need and who 
we are, and, thus, to guide what we should do or decide.
This habit of mind is as essential a part of making and finding meaning in 
life as it is of making and interpreting statutes and cases. It is the awareness 
that we are neither fully defined by nor fully free from what we have decided 
and done; it is the capacity to embrace and deal with this difficult reality. Each 
of us, for example, must think about which among our past words and deeds 
we will embrace as emblematic of who we are and why. More broadly, we 
can learn to take responsibility for the significance of what we have said and 
done and whether and how our actions and experiences define us and help us 
understand our lives. As lawyers, what we learn do in the context of public life, 
we can draw on in our own lives. And if one aspect of living well and fully is to 
understand one’s life not as pointless but rather as having some significance, 
some meaning, then this capacity, too, is of as much value in life as in the law.
The City and the Soul
 It might seem as if the context in which law addresses these questions—
questions of what can matter and what experience can mean—is far removed 
from the context in which they must be addressed in life. But this distance can 
be an advantage, as in when mapping difficult terrain one might welcome a 
chance to look at it from high ground. Legal argument looks for meaning at 
the level of the polity, and, thus, may not often speak directly to questions of 
personal thriving. But this wider scale can give one a sense of what is possible 
and of the larger context in which a particular life might be meaningful. More 
to the point, it can build the habit of mind, necessitated by the demands of legal 
argument, to think about difficult issues not just from various perspectives but 
also at different and mutually illuminating scales.
It is no coincidence that the most important book about justice and 
government is also the most thought-provoking book about individual 
thriving. Or, more accurately, the most thought-provoking book about 
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thriving is framed as a book about justice and government. Plato’s The Republic, 
although often described as an elucidation of the ideal city, is in fact an 
extended metaphor for the soul. In the process of redefining justice as a form 
of internal balance conducive to human thriving, Plato’s Socrates suggests that 
one might better read the fine print of a just man by looking to see whether 
some of the same things might be found writ large in an imaginary just city. 
What follows in The Republic, however, is neither a treatise on the ideal state 
nor a systematic examination of the relationship between the city and the soul 
but rather an extended and often exasperating conversation about both. The 
participants, and the reader, are forced to wrestle with and argue about what 
can matter at the level of both the city and the soul, how the parts of the each 
fit together, how they reflect or construct each other. 
Law school is or can be this sort of conversation, as well. In some ways, 
the law teacher is at a disadvantage, as compared to Socrates, in our efforts 
to foster this sort of conversation. We do not have the luxury of creating 
imaginary worlds for pedagogical purposes. Our students need to know the 
actual law of our actual world. But this, too, is an advantage. We are forced 
to anchor our thinking in real questions and to confront what really matters 
or ought to matter as we address those questions, which requires and enables 
us to think more clearly. Often the thinking proceeds from the private to the 
public, as it were, as we consider what private reasons ought also to count 
as public reasons. But the learning goes both ways, because thinking about 
which of our individual concerns also ought to be public reasons inevitably 
requires us to think more deeply about our individual concerns. To think well 
about what ought to matter in law and politics, we must think about what 
matters to people. Again, just as we do not simply translate private concerns 
into public life, neither do we simply take what we have seen to matter in law 
and apply it to the personal search for meaning. Rather, we think more deeply 
about both private and public life by seeing each from the perspective of the 
other. 
Rich legal thought, thus, is a process of constantly altering not just the 
angle from which we examine things but also the distance from which we 
do so. As an art lover might look closely at a painting, then step back for 
perspective; we examine life up close as we consider what matters to people, 
then from the broader remove of the law as we consider how these concerns 
ought to matter in public life. And as the art lover, having stepped back and 
gained perspective, might then move close again, equipped now with a new 
set of insights and questions demanding a new and closer look, so, too, we, 
having thought about what can matter from the illuminating remove of law 
and politics, may be better equipped to consider more closely and well what 
can matter in life.
The Socratic Method
Law students would be neither well-satisfied nor well-served if constantly 
left with as much fundamental uncertainty as is the inevitable and intended 
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consequence of Plato’s Socratic dialogues. Some things about the law are 
clear; students must know what those are. But the law school classroom rarely 
offers as much certainty as students might desire; this, too, is part of the 
way legal education works. The Socratic questioning and answering central 
to the law school classroom aims to overcome the tendency to rely on easy 
but inadequate answers to hard but unavoidable questions. It requires us to 
become comfortable with, or at least capable of, confronting uncertainty. 
Crucially, what we seek is not the murkiness that can come from confusing 
things that could be clear nor from mucking up something shallow until it is 
murky enough to seem deep. That sometimes happens, unfortunately. That 
has a name: bad teaching. Rather, the uncertainty we acknowledge and seek 
comes from seeing clearly how deep something really is. This capacity, which 
might better be called intellectual humility, is not the opposite of clear thought 
but a consequence of it. It is at the heart of Socratic wisdom. 
This capacity is essential to the study and practice of law, because important 
legal questions often do not have clear and easy answers. Despite our best 
efforts to do as described above—to consider issues from varying perspectives, 
to make sense of sometimes ambiguous authority and experience, and to 
evaluate potentially competing public and private concerns—we often will be 
left with disagreement and uncertainty in the face of difficult legal questions. 
Yet they often must be answered, at least tentatively. Law, perhaps unlike some 
fields of study, does not allow us simply to dismiss issues because we cannot 
nail them down with the certainty we might prefer. It forces us to inhabit that 
space between arrogant certainty and empty relativism.
And this, too, perhaps is the space where a meaningful life is found and 
lived. We cannot find what might matter in and give meaning to our lives if we 
lack the courage to question our own assumptions—to reject the false solace of 
an unexamined life. This is what Socrates meant when he described such a life 
as not worth living for a man.3 And courage is, indeed, a substantial part of it. 
Melville put it this way, in his remarkable “six-inch chapter:” 
Glimpses do ye seem to see of that mortally intolerable truth; that all deep, 
earnest thinking is but the intrepid effort of the soul to keep the open 
independence of her sea; while the wildest winds of heaven and earth conspire 
to cast her on the treacherous, slavish shore? / But as in landlessness alone 
resides highest truth. . . .4
Nor, however, is one likely to find much meaning in drifting merely, in 
an easy and empty relativism, or in the easy and inadequate response that 
“it depends.” As law professors have been asking students for generations: 
it depends on what? What we need is the willingness and ability to ask hard 
questions rather than duck them—to wrestle with what we know we cannot pin 
3. Apology 38a (ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος, βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ) (Bryn Mawr Greek Commentaries 
ed., Bryn Mawr Collegem Gilbert P. Rose, ed., trans. by author 1989).
4. Herman Melville, Moby Dick 108 (Oxford World Classics Ed., Avenel Books 1985) (1851). 
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down. This capacity is central to the work of law, and thus to legal education; 
and it is perhaps even more central to the work of life.
Now this may all seem rather abstract. Perhaps it would be preferable if 
I offered, instead, a list of specifics that legal education can help students 
learn about human thriving. But that would miss the point. It, again, is not 
that students learn about life in law school but rather that legal education 
can develop capacities in them that, in turn, can help them learn and thrive 
throughout life. 
By analogy, visitors could study Italian before spending time in Italy, so 
as to make the most of their trip. By speaking the language, they could talk 
more with people, understand and appreciate the culture better, learn more 
and have more fun. While learning the language before the trip, they might 
well learn something about Italy; but that would be only a hint of the value in 
doing so. Similarly, in law school, students might learn something about what 
can give meaning to a life or how they might see beauty in the world. But that 
is hardly the limit—nor, indeed, the point. The main thing they actually learn 
in law school is the law. The deeper value—the way in which law school can be 
a liberal education—lies in the capacities they can develop, and in the things 
those capacities will help them see and appreciate on their journey.
At some risk of overworking the analogy, it is hardly necessary to learn 
Italian before traveling to Italy, and not everyone will be eager or indeed able 
to do so. The value of that effort will depend in part on the purpose of the 
trip. Are you just going to Italy for business—to do deals or to earn money? If 
so, you probably could get by with a phrase book or by mostly dealing with 
Italians who speak English. Or do you aim to learn as much as you can and to 
appreciate and enjoy as fully as possible what you see and hear? Ask the same 
question about the capacities potentially developed by legal education in the 
context of life. If you just want to make deals and earn money, the deeper 
capacities, while potentially useful, are inessential; you probably can get by 
treating law school as mere professional training. Or is it your hope to make 
the most of this journey as well?
Insight and Ethics
I began by observing that those thoughtful about liberal undergraduate 
education are able to speak to its broader potential benefits. Andrew Delbanco, 
for example, in his illuminating defense of liberal education, describes a set of 
capacities potentially developed in college:
1. A skeptical discontent with the present, informed by a sense of the past.
2. The ability to make connections among seemingly disparate phenomena.
3. Appreciation of the natural world, enhanced by knowledge of science 
and the arts.
4. A willingness to imagine experience from perspectives other than one’s 
own.
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5. A sense of ethical responsibility.5
It is noteworthy that Delbanco’s list overlaps almost completely the ways 
in which legal education can enhance one’s capacity to thrive. In particular, 
four of these five capacities are essentially ways of seeing—ways in which a 
liberal education equips one better to understand and appreciate others and 
the world. Law school, seen in this light, is, indeed, a form of continued, albeit 
more-focused, liberal education of just this sort.
There is, however, a notable outlier among the traits described by Delbanco. 
It is the last listed—a sense of ethical responsibility. Unlike the others, this 
is not a trait that can be easily re-understood as a component of an internal 
capacity for understanding and appreciation. It points outward and refers 
as much to conduct as comprehension. It is also the trait that so far finds 
no parallel in the account I have offered here, and, as such, it highlights a 
potential lacuna in this account and points to a deeper potential critique of 
the way I have described the benefits of legal education. One might suggest 
that my account is selfish, lacking the other-regarding element that would call 
our attention not just to questions of legal ethics but also to broader concerns 
of social responsibility.
I could demur, given my focus on individual thriving, and simply say that, 
in addition to the study of the law itself and the thriving-enabling capacities 
that study can engender, legal education ought also to include an ethical and 
social-responsibility component—presumably in the form of some combination 
of external rule-based constraints or internal deontological-ethical principles. 
But to those who would prefer to see ethics as an integral part of, rather than 
merely a constraint on, the study and practice of law this would not suffice. 
And it need not.
In fact, just as the personal and human benefits of legal education can 
emerge from, rather than require compromise with, the professional training 
central to the law school mission, so too do at least some ethical considerations. 
The thriving concerns highlighted here may actually serve as a link between 
doctrine and ethics, a way of both anchoring ethical thought in the study of 
law and encouraging ethical behavior in the practice of law. In particular, 
learning to think better about what matters may be more effective than ethical 
rules or deontological constraints in helping us treat others more justly. 
This might be the case if understanding manifests itself as empathy, and, 
in turn, as more just treatment of others. James argued that the certain 
blindness he described—the inability to see things as others do and understand 
what matters to them—“lies at the root of every stupid and sanguinary mistake 
that rulers over subjects make.”6 If so, and if liberal education can alert us 
not just to this blindness but actually to help us see better, then perhaps even 
an initially self-regarding search for understanding and meaning can lead 
5. Andrew Delbanco, College: What it Was, Is, and Should Be 3 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012).
6. William James, What Makes a Life Significant, in Talks to Teachers, supra note 1, at 265.
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to better other-regarding action. Perhaps. But it is also possible that greater 
understanding of what matters to others will be put to work in the service of 
profit or exploitation, as with salesmen or advertisers. If I am more sanguine 
than James regarding our capacity to overcome our blindness, I am less so 
regarding the direct and immediate consequences for others of our doing so.
Rather, if we can expect greater understanding to lead not only to greater 
personal thriving but also better public conduct, it will be because of the 
indirect, rather than the immediate consequences of comprehension and 
appreciation. And here again, Plato’s The Republic may be our best source of 
insight. One reading of The Republic, and in particular the conversation in Book 
IX on the connection between justice and happiness, is that a certain right 
internal balance—Socrates offers it as deeper definition of justice—will bring 
about the external conduct through which justice is usually described. 
Through the metaphor of the city, Socrates suggests that just individuals 
have put the knowledge-loving part of their own souls in charge of the honor-
loving and pleasure-seeking parts. He also suggests that people who have 
thought deeply about what brings happiness and who have learned to see the 
transcendent order and beauty of the world will be such knowledge-loving 
individuals. Those who have thought well about what ought to matter will 
see that not money and glory but rather knowledge and understanding are the 
central components of a rich and blessed life. They will disdain money and 
honor, accepting each only as necessary; and, disdaining the things injustice 
might bring, they will have little or no reason to be unjust. Knowledge, unlike 
the lesser goods, is not a zero-sum game; the love of it offers no motive to 
treat others unjustly. This is perhaps best understood as a particular facet of 
the broader Socratic view that people do wrong when they do wrong out of 
ignorance about what will really make them thrive. If so, then just or ethical 
behavior towards others is best understood as the outward manifestation of a 
deeper internal insight into what really matters. 
I do not claim that the capacities developed by legal education render 
unnecessary an explicit ethical component as part of the law school curriculum. 
Just as legal education should and does include a great deal of straight-
forward doctrinal learning; it should include an explicit focus on ethical rules 
and concerns.
Conclusion
I have argued, so far, that the ability to see and to understand others and 
the world can help one thrive by helping one explore the range of possible 
ways in which one might find meaning in or give meaning to life, and that 
legal education can engender this ability. I might further suggest, albeit more 
tentatively, that seeing and appreciating may not just help make such a rich 
and full life possible, but may to some extent constitute such a life. Perhaps, as 
Frost’s farmer-turned-stargazer put it, “[t]he best thing that we’re put here for’s 
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to see.”7 Put differently, if Socrates is right that a deep understanding of the 
human condition will reveal that understanding itself is one of life’s greatest 
goods, then an education that helps us see and understand the word better is 
even more directly connected to thriving than we have so far suggested. 
Each of the habits of mind we have seen as central to law, and applicable 
to life, can not only help students and lawyers find a place in the world, but, 
more generally, can help them better see the world itself. By learning to see 
things from different imagined perspectives, and in light of experience, and at 
varying scales, and with courage in the face of uncertainty, we can learn to see 
everything better. And perhaps, if we could see it better, we could better see 
its beauty. In this sense, legal education truly is a form of liberal education—
helping us see and appreciate even things far removed from anything discussed 
in law school. 
But let me conclude by stepping back from this particular speculation 
because the potential value of legal education as liberal education does not 
hinge on my or any particular account of what might be the deepest meaning 
and most satisfying purpose in life. Granted, the Socratic hope, described 
above—that deeper internal thought may lead to better and more just external 
conduct—hangs on the further hope that thinking well about what matters 
will lead one to value knowledge rather than power and money and the like. 
But my claim about the potential personal value of legal education does not 
depend on that or any other particular expectation about what our deepened 
thinking will reveal. 
Perhaps our truest thriving does lie in an awareness and appreciation of 
the profound order and beauty of the world. But perhaps it is rather to be 
found in service to others, or in the nurturing of the creative impulse, or in 
coming to the right relationship with God, or in finding some oneness and 
unity with the universe, or in love, or in some as yet unimagined combination 
or unity of these things and more. Perhaps it will not be the same for each 
of us. But wherever lies a rich and meaningful way of living, and whether 
it be manifold or one, we all should agree that it is worth seeking. And we 
should all agree that what increases our ability and willingness to look for it 
is of great value indeed. Legal education can do just this, even as it teaches 
the substance and practice of law—by engendering the capacity to see from 
different perspectives different potential sources of meaning, to make sense of 
and take responsibility for experience, to wrestle with the connections between 
individual and community life, and to confront courageously the humbling 
Socratic uncertainty that follows clear thought.
W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, regarding undergraduate education, that “[t]he true 
college will ever have one goal—not to earn meat, but to know the end and aim 
of that life which meat nourishes.”8 Now, I do not claim that this should be the 
7. Robert Frost, The Star-Splitter, in The Poetry of Robert Frost 176 (Henry Holt and Co. 
1969).
8. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 82  (A.C. McClurg & Co. 1907) (1903).
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“one goal” of legal education, which must have as its primary aim to prepare 
people for the practice of law and public service. It is heartening, however, 
to consider the ways in which that the same education—the very training that 
best serves these pragmatic professional and public purposes—can also, by 
developing capacities as valuable to the person as to the lawyer or leader, serve 
this deeper human end as well.
